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Article 5

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

be innocent according to the law. The prisoner might be insane, he might be unacquainted with all of the facts-as in the
Boom case--or the homicide might have been justifiable. Of
all these, neither the prisoner nor the lawyer is the judge. Only
the regularly constituted tribunals can determine the guilt or
innocence of a man; it is not for the lawyer to say a man has
committed a crime according to the law, when he is not the
judge of the law.
C. J.R.

THE WRIGHT LAW : TWO WEAKNESSES
The prohibition statute of Indiana, commonly known as
the Wright law, has been in force for more than a year. Since
its enactment numerous public men -in all walks of life have
criticized and even denounced the law because of its imputed injustice and rank severity. They have branded it as an encroachment upon our Bill of Rights, and as a direct attack upon human
liberty. The purpose of this article, however, is not to discuss
the Wright law from the layman's point of view. Here we are
concerned with its legal structure and significance rather than
with any social or ethical problems which it may arouse. Is
the Wright law constitutional? That is the question which we
ask and ir the following paragraphs we shall endeavor to point
out two constitutional weaknesses which have a direct bearing
upon the question under consideration.
Section 19 of Article 4 of the Indiana constitution reads:
"Every aot shall embrace but one subject and matters properly
connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the
title. But, if any subject shall be embraced in the act which
shall not be expressed in the title, such act will be void only as
to so much thereof as shall not be expressed, in the title." -This
means that each act of the legislature shall embrace but one
subject and that each provision of the act shall be germane to
the title. The purpose of this provision is to apprize the legislature and the public in general in regard to proposed or enacted legislation. The Indiana Supreme Court has been very
liberal in construing this statute, but it has repeatedly held that
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laws which contain provisions not clearly germane to their titles
are void.
The Wright law is entitled "An Act Concerning Intoxicating Liquors." Section 9 of the same law -deals with the "Operation of Motor vehicles while Intoxicated" and Section 30 concerns itself with "Damages-Right of Action of Party Injured
by Intoxicated Person." Are these two provisions embraced
in the title of the act? The criterion for such a question, as
laid down in State v. Young, 47 Ind. 150, is as follows: "Suppose
that there was no cther provision in the Act, * * * if the section
could not stand under the title it must fall." Applying this
test to the above mentioned title and sections a strong argument
can be presented in favor of the contention that the two sections
are not embraced in the title of the act. The title relates to
intoxicating liquors while sections 9 and 30 are -concerned with
intoxicated persons and with those only incidentally, and section 30 departs even further by dealing with a matter of damages. Certainly the latter has no possible legal connection with
the title of the act. Nor can these two sections be said to have
any connections with the remaining provisions of the act, which
concern themselves, as the title indicates, with intoxicating
liquors? On this point the Indiana Supreme Court has held
that where two or more subjects have no legal connection with
each other and are embraced in the same act, such act is void,
Grubbs v. State, 24 and. 295; Igoe v. State, 14 Ind. 196; State v.
Commercial Insurance Co., 158 Ind. 680.
In the case of Ind. Central Railway Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind., 681 it
was held that the criminal and civil codes should be distinguished by separate titles. If this were the settled law in Indiana ,the Wright law could not stand, because the Act intended
as a criminal enactment contains a clause determining the measure of damages in a civil suit. But in Kleizer v. State, 15 Ind. 449
the ruling of the Potts case was criticized and apparently overruled. However, the case went off on several different grounds,
,so that it cannot be ascertained just how the Court would rule
on this point if it were to come up for final determination.
'Perhaps the more potent weakness to be found in the Wright
law is contained in section 4 which reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, receive, manufacture, transport,
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ship, possess, sell, barter, exchange, give away, furnish, or otherwise handle or dispose of any intoxicating liquor except as characterized by this act." No other prohibition statute, either
state or federal, makes unqualified possession of liquor a criminal offense. The Volstead Act does not make mere possession
of intoxicating liquors, isolated from all other facts and circumstances, a crime. U. S. v. Dowling, 278 Fed. 630, and if it did it
would exceed the authority conferred upon congress by the Eighteenth Amendment, U. S. v. Ollig, 288 Fed. 939.
Furthermore, it has been held (Common-wealth v. Campbell,
117 S. W. 383) that the police power of a state does not extend
to the deprivation of a citizen of the right to have intoxicating
liquors in his possession for his own use, the court holding that
it is "an abridgment of the privileges and immunities of the
citizen without legal justification." -Ex parte Brown, 38 Texas Criminal Rep. 295; Titsworth v. State, 101 Pac. 288. In Spooner v.
Curtis, 96 So. 836, it was held that where liquors are lawfully obtained, and are used for family purposes, the state cannot abridge
the privileges expressly conferred by the Federal law. Hall v.
Maran, 8, Fla. 706; Ex Parte Francis.79 So. 75; Walker v. Dawson, 66 S. E. 984.
The only Indiana decision found which has any relation whatsoever upon the point under discussion is Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501,
in which a law providing that no person should drink any intoxicating liqours except as medicine, was held to be void as violating all constitutional guards. The Wright law makes mere
possession of liquor whether lawfully or unlawfully obtained a
crime. We have just seen that a great many juri'sdictions hold
that such a statute is unconstitutional. Only until a test is made
can we know how the Indiana Court will decide.
Thus we have endeavored to point out two constitutional
weaknesses in the Wright law. We do not attempt to pass
upon their .sufficiency in rendering the statute unconstitutional.
That can only be decided through a judicial proceeding.
L. M. S.

